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ABSTRACT

The purposes of this paper are to explore the relationship between dialogic communication and conflict analysis and to examine current assumptions about conflict and communication as described in the speech communication literature. The first part of the paper discusses dialogue, in particular that of Martin Buber, as a conflict method. Specifically, it describes three major components of Buber's dialogue: (1) "the between" as an alternative to the notion of meaning emerging from inside the person, (2) the primacy of situational demand as opposed to emphasis on the "real self," and (3) commitment in openness as a rejection of positions of absolute certainty and relativistic postures of nonevaluation. The second part of the paper offers an analysis of how a dialogical approach to conflict resolution is in stark contrast to Christopher Lasch's "culture of narcissism," and Tom Wolfe's "Me decade." The conclusion of the paper describes the implications of communication and conflict theory as a challenge to the narcissism of current times. (FL)

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DIALOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

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DIALOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Dialogue[1] and conflict[2] are not novel to speech communication literature, as indicated by interpersonal and rhetorical investigation.[3] Thus, concepts and assumptions are freely drawn from the results of both rhetorical and interpersonal studies. Perhaps the major point of overlap between interpersonal and rhetorical studies is the area of human conflict. The reason for this dual interest is the inevitable occurrence of conflict in human living. To avoid studying conflict is tantamount to investigating human communication without an interpersonal partner or a rhetorical audience. As Barbara Stanford states, "Conflict is so central to life that it cannot be eliminated without eliminating life as we know it....A peace achieved by eliminating conflict is the peace of the graveyard."[4]

Yet with the recent emphasis in the last decade on dialogue and conflict studies, little has been done to investigate these two areas in combination. In speech communication literature, the most overt statement about the compatibility of conflict and dialogue was announced in Brown and Keller's Monologue to Dialogue. They asserted that the test of any dialogue is not in casual conversation, but in conflict.[5] Following Brown and Keller's contention, the first aim of this paper is to further explore the relationship between dialogic communication and conflict analysis.

The second aim of this paper is to examine current assumptions about conflict and communication as described by speech communication literature. A brief tracing of the changes in assumptions about communication and conflict is followed by a critique rooted in a dialogic framework.[6] This analysis examines how a dialogical approach to conflict resolution is in stark contrast to what Lasch has so aptly titled The Culture of Narcissism,[7] and Tom Wolfe has called the "Me Decade."[8] The conclusion of this paper describes the implications of communication and conflict theory as a challenge to the narcissism of our time.

PART ONE

DIALOGUE AS A CONFLICT METHOD

The focus on conflict styles[9] is essential in gaining insight into interpersonal behavior in conflict situations. Various styles are influenced by the method one chooses to approach the other human being. Methods described by game theory, Rogerian optimism in the individual, and Marxian analysis each lead to different communicative styles when engaging in a conflict situation. The dialogue of Martin Buber is yet another method that results in a particular way of approaching and handling conflict situations.[10]

The task of this part of the paper is to describe three major components of Martin Buber's dialogue: (1) "the between" as an alternative to the notion of meaning emerging from inside the person, (2) the primacy of situational demand as opposed to emphasis on the "Real Self", and (3) commitment in openness as a rejection of positions of absolute certainty and relativistic postures of nonevaluation.

"Between" Persons

The dialogical notion of "between" has been described by Johannesen (1971), Brown and Keller (1973), Poulakos (1974), and Stewart (1978).[11] However, of these initial presentations, only Stewart remains in accordance with the dialogical position of Martin Buber. The other authors shift between Rogers' view of dialogue, which should be called a humanistic communication, and Buber's dialogue. Rogers quotes Buber and then utilizes dialogical concepts in subjective and psychological analysis. Buber's understanding of dialogue is rooted in a phenomenological, non-subject/object orientation, which is in sharp contrast to Rogers' orientation. In the recordings of the classic debate between Rogers and Buber, the division between the two approaches is clear. Buber openly stated his irritation with Rogers' ignorance of the ground out of which the term dialogue had been intellectually nourished. "I have learned in the course of my life to appreciate terms. And I think that in modern psychology, this does not exist in sufficient measure. When I find something that is essentially different from another thing, I want a new term. I want a new concept."[12]

A fundamental difference between Rogers' and Buber's approaches is apparent in their understanding of where meaning emerges in an interpersonal relationship. Rogers' emphasis on organismic impulses, the inherent goodness of the organism, and getting in touch with one's internal feelings reflect an internal bias, in which meaning is conceptualized as emerging from inside the person. Contention with this inner focus is argued by Simons in the prologue to Perspectives on Communication and Social Conflict. He contends that the assertion

"the meaning is in the person" is a professional bias, which is inappropriate and ultimately not a fruitful research premise.[13]

Unlike the internal emphasis, the "meaning being in the person," the notion of the "between" is consistent with the emphasis on transactionalism in communication. Mortensen provided an important service by tracing the roots of the transactional viewpoint back to Dewey's and Bentley's classic work, Knowing and the Known. Mortensen states that transactionalism implies an interdependent orientation where the meaning of a conflict encounter emerges "between" persons.[14] However, not all conflicts are defined by the parties involved as emerging "between" them. The contention, "It is your problem, not mine," can still strike at the heart of any attempt to solve a conflict on a reciprocal basis.[15] Buber himself was aware that not all communicative events could be termed dialogical; clearly not all people see relationships as interdependent. Perhaps dialogical approaches to conflict are ultimately most appropriate when the two parties in exchange see the relationship of high importance. In short, dialogue implies a world view in which "we" has primacy over "me".

Such a "we" perspective is at odds with the focus on the inner self and the notion that the "meaning is in the person." One need only examine popular literature and numerous theories in the human sciences and humanities that seek an alternative to behavioral and manipulative approaches to discover a primacy on the inner person. Unfortunately, the focus on the inner person often leads to a "me" analysis, which is a result of psychologistic and subjectivistic emphasis on the psyche, or inner person.[16] A primary contribution of Buber's dialogue is that it rejects both theories that dehumanize and those that dwell in

the subjective "me" of psychologism.

> The psychological, that which happens within the souls of each, is only the secret accompaniment to the dialogue. The meaning of this dialogue is found in neither one nor the other of the partners, nor in both added together, but in their interchange. This distinction between the 'dialogical' and the psychological constitutes a radical attack on the psychologism of our age. [17]

The consequences of emphasizing the "between" as a radical alternative to an inner focus is that affect or feeling no longer can be considered the primary criteria for evaluating the appropriateness and success of a conflict strategy. Such an orientation is at odds with the classic definition of productive and destructive conflict described by Deutsch.

> '...a conflict clearly has destructive characteristics if the participants in it are dissatisfied with the outcomes and all feel they have lost as a result of the conflict. Similarly, a conflict has productive consequences if the participants all are satisfied with their outcomes and feel they have gained as a result of the conflict. [18]

A dialogical view of conflict rejects Deutsch's thesis. Although, in most instances, a conflict is beneficially resolved when both parties are satisfied, dialogically one may resolve a conflict in accordance with the situation, yet feel internally dissatisfied. Not all appropriate resolutions of conflict will make one feel good. Ruben (1978) has similarly contended with Deutsch's affective emphasis.

> While the view of conflict epitomized by Deutsch is widely cited, it seems to fail to take account of the transactional, symbolic, and reflexive aspects of communication... an affective criteria is clearly not an adequate basis for determining whether conflict is good or bad, functional or disfunctional, to be avoided or not. [19]

Ruben then quotes Simmel to emphasize that learning can and does often happen from frustration and pain, not always from satisfaction. [20]

Maurice Friedman provides a classic critique of the affective

criteria, which is the ground of Rogers' and other third-force proponents' notion of self-fulfillment. The human cannot "...ignore the possibility of the tragic conflict between realizing one's potentialities to the full and playing one's part in an historical situation which may call on one to sacrifice this realization of self , and perhaps life itself."[21] Thus, one's internal feeling cannot be the primary guide in attaining the "between" of dialogue. One may even work for a resolution that does not feel right for oneself, but is demanded and is right for the situation. The importance and definition of the dialogical notions of rightness and situational demand are clarified in the next section.

Situational Demand

Viktor Frankl stated that each situation calls for a unique and right response. A wrong response is not morally inferior, but inadequate for the demands of that particular moment created by two people participating in an historically situated context.[22] The Frankl request to respond appropriately to the demands of the situation is also described by Friedman[23] and Buber.[24] The implications of such responding are twofold: (1) one's attention needs to be focused on the communication at hand, not one's inner self, and (2) the notion of the "real self" is dialogically an abstraction. The danger of the inner "true self" is that one may focus attention on what a conflict means for "me", as Simons and Ruben revealed, rather than meeting the demands of the situation. A common example of such an occurrence is available to any parent of a young child. The child wakes up in the

night and requires attention. Yet the parent feels tired and wants to get more sleep in order to meet the schedule of the coming work day. If the parent follows his or her internal impulses, the child may be left alone to cry. However, if the parent is sensitive to the demand of the situation, such a response may or may not be appropriate. Only a parent sensitive to the situation can usually tell if attention or ignoring is required.

Such a situation conscious approach is not new to the rhetorical nature of our field. Bitzer in his classic article, "The Rhetorical Situation," describes what could also be termed the dialogical situation in interpersonal conflict. He stated, "Although rhetorical situation invites response, it obviously does not invite just any response. Thus, the ...characteristic of rhetorical situation is that it invites a fitting response, a response that fits the situation."[25]

Focus on the importance of situational demand can also be found in interpersonal communication studies. The rhetorical sensitivity studies of Hart have revealed the notion of the "Real Self" to be an abstraction oblivious to the transactional and situational nature of human communication.[26] Darnell and Brockriede, in Persons Communicating, even established another category for rhetorical sensitivity that separates it from opposing extremes of wanting to be true to their real or "noble" self and those who are completely molded by the company and situation that meets them.[27]

There is precedent for the situational sensitivity implied by the "between" of Buber's dialogue in speech communication literature. However, a word of caution is needed about the notion of sensitivity

to the dialogical situation. This concept always involves both parties in an interpersonal exchange, as well as the particular uniqueness of the historical moment. If one of the components of a situation is changed, a person or historical moment, the situation will demand a different response. No a priori technique can be foisted on a situation if one seeks to provide a dialogically sensitive response.

Sensitivity to the dialogical situation implies an appreciation of Stewart's emphasis on noninterchangability of persons[28] and the need to respond to the demands of the historical moment. Sensitivity to these components is suggested by a classic statement from Between Man and Man.

> "Genuine responsibility exists only where there is real responding.... Moreover, nothing that he believed he possessed as always available would help him, no knowledge and no technique, no system, and no programme; for now he would have to do with concretion itself... We respond to the moment, but at the same time we respond on its behalf, we answer for it."[29]

A dramatic illustration of situational demand is described by Viktor Frankl. Shortly before the United States entered World War II, Frankl was to receive his immigration visa to the United States. Frankl's elderly parents fully expected him to leave Austria. But at the last minute he hesitated. He knew that any day his parents would be taken to a concentration camp and was in conflict about whether or not to stay with them. As he considered the consequences of his actions he noticed a piece of marble on a table at his home.

> When I asked my father about it, he explained that he had found it on the site where the National Socialists had burned down the largest Viennese synagogue. My father had taken this marble piece home because it was part of the ten commandments. The piece showed one engraved and

> gilded Hebrew letter. My father explained that this letter is the abbreviation for only one of the commandments. Eagerly I asked, 'Which one is it?' The answer was 'Honor thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon the land.' So I stayed with my father and my mother upon the land and decided to let the American visa lapse.[30]

Frankl's story is extraordinary and open to numerous psychological interpretations of projection and rationalization. However, such interpretations are valid only as affect, not the situation, guides one's actions. Both Frankl's experience and rhetorical and interpersonal studies reveal that sensitivity to the demand of the situation "between" persons, although not always the norm, is a possibility. However, the dialogical guide of such sensitivity can only be helpful when one approaches issues, events, and persons with a viewpoint that is open to change as the demand of the situation makes it appropriate to shift course. As the next section announces, dialogue is an alternative to rigid absolute responses and the valueless vacuum of relativism; it is rooted in the unity of judgment and confirmation.

Commitment in Openness

Maurice Friedman describes the notion touchstone as a dialogical alternative to absolute and relative views of truth. Touchstone is a metaphor that implies one is touching a stone or holding a viewpoint, rather than grasping a rock or opinion. Touch suggests importance, but in all probability, change. A touchstone is a viewpoint that is constantly being re-examined for its appropriateness. However one could go through an entire lifetime without altering a particular opinion, if it continued to pass rigorous examination.

Judgment separates touchstone from relativism. Viewpoints are evaluated with some being considered plainly wrong. But this judgment is tempered with the knowledge that one's own viewpoint is limited and possibly wrong also. The only way to keep one's opinion from becoming a closed and arrogant assumption is to be open to the challenge from alternative perspectives and willing to change or modify as the situation dictates.[31] Martin Buber points to this same issue with the concept, narrow ridge.

> Buber's narrow ridge is not a happy middle which ignores the reality of paradox and contradiction in order to escape from the suffering they produce. It is rather a paradoxical unity of what one usually understands only as alternatives -- I and Thou, love and justice, dependence and freedom .... 'According to the logical conception of truth only one of two contraries can be true, but in the reality as one lives it they are inseparable .... The unity of the contraries is the mystery at the innermost core of the dialogue.' [32]

In operational terms, touchstone or narrow ridge in human conflict is the uniting of the seeming contradictories of power and love. Power is not viewed as absolute and love is not allowed to mask wrong in nonjudgment when the two are fused. Such a viewpoint was described by Martin Luther King, Jr., who attempted to utilize a dialogical orientation in his protests, according to Maurice Friedman.[33] Robert Scott[34] and Herbert Simons[35] also saw the unity of contradictories in King's approach as they quoted his well known statement on power and love. "There is nothing wrong with power if power is used correctly .... What is needed is a realization that power without love is reckless and abusive and love without power is sentimental and anaemic. Power at best is love implementing the demands of justice, and justice at its

best is power correcting everything that stands against love."[36] Power makes love more meaningful as giving is matched with demanding. In the essay, "Power and Love,"[37] Buber suggests that challenge, confrontation, analysis, and at times rejection of societal presuppositions must guide one's feelings of care and love for others.

Buber's dialogue is in accordance with his understanding of power and love as united. Dialogue is rooted in judgment and confirmation, which correlates appropriately with power and love, respectively. Buber attempted to confirm the person, but he also recognized the importance of judgment. Perhaps no where is this clearer than when he was awarded the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade in Paulskirche, Frankfurt, Germany on September 27, 1953, less than ten years after the systematic slaughter of seven million Jews. In this address he walked the narrow ridge between the power of judgment and the love of confirmation that recognized that the common link between persons is often a shared moral weakness. Buber expressed his honest judgment as he stated:

> I, who am one of those who remained alive, have only in a formal sense a common humanity with those who took part in this action. They have so radically removed themselves from the human sphere, so transposed themselves into a sphere of monstrous inhumanity inaccessible to my conception, that not even hatred, much less an overcoming of hatred, was able to arise in me. And what am I that I could here presume to 'forgive'![38]

Buber then followed his initial remarks by establishing a common link between him and his audience, as he confirmed their personhood as he also judged.

> When I think of the German people of the days of Auschwitz and Treblinka, I behold, first of all, the great many who

> knew that the monstrous event was taking place and did not oppose it. But my heart, which is acquainted with the weakness of men, refuses to condemn my neighbor for not prevailing upon himself to become a martyr. Next there emerges before me the mass of those who remained ignorant of what was withheld from the German public, and who did not try to discover what reality lay behind the rumours which were circulating. When I have these men in mind, I am gripped by the thought of the anxiety, likewise well known to me, of the human creature before a truth which he fears he cannot face. But finally there appears before me, from reliable reports, some who have become as familiar to me by sight, action, and voice as if they were friends, those who refused to carry out the orders and suffered death or put themselves to death, and those who learned what was taking place and opposed it and were put to death, or those who learned what was taking place and because they could do nothing to stop it killed themselves. I see these men very near before me in that especial intimacy which binds us at times to the dead and to them alone. Reverence and love for these Germans now fills my heart.[39]

Buber's dialogue provides an appropriate foundation for conflict theory. The narrow ridge unity of power and love couples demand and judgment with interpersonal responsibility of confirmation. Yet, only the demand of the situation, not affect, can be one's guide to the quantity and quality of stress given to the opposing elements of the dialogical unity. Seldom will an equal emphasis on judgment and confirmation be called forth. But for dialogue to be given birth, they must work in combination.

Buber provides an alternative to status quo theories and the idealism of nonjudgment. As Scott and Smith state:

> Since the time of Aristotle, academic rhetorics have been for the most part instruments of established society, presupposing the 'goods' of order...[and] decorum.... Challenges to the sufficiency of this theory and its presuppositions have been few, and largely proposed by elusive theologians such as Kierkegaard or Buber...[40]

Part Two of this paper reveals how dialogic theory compares with current assumptions about conflict theory, as described in speech communication

literature, which further announces a dialogic critique of some well accepted cultural norms.

PART TWO

A DIALOGICAL CRITIQUE OF ASSUMPTIONS

A number of important articles examining human conflict have become standard references in speech communication literature, as described earlier. In particular, three articles have provided stimulating and at times powerful critiques of assumptions undergirding speech communication's view of human conflict: Scott and Smith (1969), Simons (1972), and Hawes and Smith (1973). Each of these articles emphasized two major points. First, for too long an anti-conflict and pro-establishment bias has dominated the study of human conflict. Second, coercive and tough negotiating has often been seen as unethical or unproductive. It is the contention of this paper that the first point has been incorporated into the discipline with the notion of conflict management. However, examination reveals that this concept falls short of implying an alternative to a pro-establishment bias. The second point emphasizing the situational importance of coercion, is accepted by this paper. Dialogically one can engage in ethical coercion, which rejects the "humanistic" emphasis on nonevaluation and the scientific model of objectivity.

This paper also critiques two additional assumptions prevalent in the literature. The first was pointed to in Part One; an internal bias limits an interdependent and transactional view of conflict. And the

final assumption explored reveals effectiveness or reward as a motivation for conflict encounter. Yet at times, effectiveness is insufficient as a dialogical criteria for determining if one should openly initiate a conflict exchange. The purpose of such an evaluation is to reveal the current state of conflict assumptions in speech communication literature and to test them with the dialogical orientation, which has been termed a societal critique at its foundational roots.[41]

Conflict Management

In the Hawes and Smith article, Kenneth boulding is quoted in support of the term management, as a replacement for the term resolution. Boulding, well known for his work in a variety of fields, is particularly well respected by conflict and peace researchers. He stated the following points: (1) there is not always a direct correlation between constructive and destructive conflict and resolved and unresolved conflict, respectively, (2) sometimes there is a need for prolonging the conflict by lowering its intensity in hopes of maintaining it for a longer duration.[42] With both of these statements, no contention is taken in this paper. However, the following Boulding quotation used by Hawes and Smith requires attention. "I am not sure now, however, that 'resolution' was the right word [for the Journal of Conflict Resolution] ....the more neutral word 'management' may better describe the objectives of our enterprize."[43] The points of interest in this quotation are Boulding's hesitation about abandoning the term resolution and his contention that the term management is a neutral term.

Boulding's hesitation about adopting the term management is supported by this author. Management is not considered a neutral term within the

hierarchial orientation of our society. The taken-for-granted cultural baggage of this term suggests having someone to manage. As speech communication theorists such as Deetz have stated, concepts need to be used with care. They are not neutral events; they commit the user to a world view, a position,[44] which implies that neutrality of inquiry is not possible.[45] The mere act of deciding what to study or explore is a choice rooted in value, as persuasively argued by the conflict theorist, Anatol Rapoport.[46] Honest analysis of conflict situations need to announce the perspective and bias that one carries into the inquiry.

Such an orientation is inherent in the work of John Waite Bowers (1974), when he stated: "It will be apparent that my bias is anti-institutional.... People working in institutions.... tend to feel little personal responsibility for their official acts because those who make decisions are seldom those who implement decisions."[47] Bowers' honesty is called for by individuals related to both interpersonal and rhetorical studies. The father of third-force psychology, Abraham Maslow, whose notion of self-actualization is so common to interpersonal literature, was outspoken about this issue.[48] In addition, the works of Nilsen[49] and Wallace[50] recognize the importance of sharing one's motivations and values with an audience, particularly if one is attempting a one-sided address.

Like Boulding, this author feels some uncertainty about which term to use-resolution, management, or perhaps conflict regulation, as described in Paul Wehr's new work.[51] Each has its limitations. Management, the current term in speech literature, seems to imply an establishment orientation that is in discordance with the initial

reason for abandoning the resolution terminology. The value underlying management of conflict is sometimes positive, but, more often than not, brings to awareness the power of those in control to manipulate a conflict instead of deal with the real need for change. How many conflicts were managed by the use of encounter groups, instead of making fundamental changes in the organizational structure?[52] How often is internal dissention managed by the outside groups that benefit from the struggle? How many people think of controllers, rather than people in a one-down position of a complementary relationship when the term management is utilized? The answer to each question indicates that the person of lesser power is the one likely to be managed and the need for fundamental change is likely to be ignored.

Granted, management of conflict can be accomplished with the interest of both parties in mind. Also resolution can occur with no improvement in the one-down complementary relationship or with a result in power parity. Thus, both the terms management and resolution can have establishment and change orientations depending on how they are employed.

There is no clear answer to the semantic problem of what qualifier to place after the term conflict. As important as the use of a term is, it may not be the most fundamental issue. As Bowers suggests, the value system one takes into a conflict encounter is the critical issue. Although no new term to describe conflict is offered here, skepticism about the term management is present. This author, like Bowers, has a tendency toward an anti-institutional bias. Fundamental change

is unlikely to occur if those in control successfully manage a conflict, thereby often not resolving, but dissipating the energy of the conflict initiators.

In conflict encounters the value one places on maintaining the established order or working for significant change is the primary issue.[53] For any dialogue to be initiated, an honest disclosure of one's orientation is essential. Without such an understanding, too much effort is spent trying to outguess one's opponent, rather than deal with the real issues of contention between persons. However, such openness does not imply a soft-hearted approach to conflict situations, as the next section reveals.

Coercion

Herbert Simons has brought the importance of coercion in conflict situations to the awareness of the speech communication field in a number of articles.[54] Hawes and Smith describe the importance of tough negotiating.[55] Scott and Smith, Burgess, and Heath, are also in agreement that coercion is sometimes an appropriate rhetorical mode in a conflict setting.[56] Haiman, in his ethical analysis of conflict in the streets during the late sixties, clearly reveals the importance and the necessity of coercion, at times. When one is not of the power mainstream, drastic measures must sometimes be taken to get another to listen.[57] If one accepts Nilsen's analysis of coercion as involving only one option, rather than a variety of suggestions from which to choose,[58] it is possible to visualize the necessity of coercive measures in interpersonal conflict. A battered spouse who

finally says, "Change or ..."; an employee who states, "Treat me with dignity or ... "; the parent that states, "Be home by midnight or ... " are all examples of coercion. Although coercion has been given sanction at times by some communication theorists, no ethical analysis of when coercion is appropriate has been clearly described. In dialogic communication, such a differentiation between ethical and unethical coercion has been described by Murti (1968) and Arnett (1980) in their discussions of Gandhi's satyagraha as a dialogical conflict method in action.[59]

Due to the extensive nature of the question of the ethics of coercion, this paper will only examine nonviolent forces of coercion. However, Buber was not a proponent of nonviolence in all situations. The letters exchanged between he and Gandhi reveal the sharp disagreement of opinion on the issue regarding the Jewish people and Hitler's Germany.[60] Such analysis is left for others to explore. Perhaps one could contend that only the dialogical situation can demand that one abandon nonviolent principles in favor of violence. However, once one makes such a choice, the dual function of confirmation of personhood rooted in judgment seems impossible as one seeks to physically harm another. One then moves to a monological conflict style. But, Buber makes it very clear that monologue can not and should not always be avoided.

Gandhi distinguished between satyagraha and duragraha as methods for dealing with human conflict. Although both terms have the same sanskrit noun agraha, which means "firm grasping", the perfix dur implies difficult. One can translate duragraha as stubborn bias.

In terms of methods of change, this suggests a self-righteous arrogance grounded in harassing techniques that ignore the possibility of supportive measures that might win support from one's opponent at a later date.[61]

Satyagraha is rooted not in a closed bias, but rather the context of commitment in openness, as described in Part One of this paper. The end is flexible and never totally predictable. One must listen to the opponent's viewpoint to the extent of altering one's own, if the other's position seems persuasive and appropriate to the demands of the situation. However, if the other's view does not persuade, then one presses forward with one's own program of change.[62] At this point to many outside observers satyagraha will appear as coercive as duragraha. The distinction is that satyagraha is grounded in concern for the situation. The desire is to respond to the needs of the conflict situation. If the situation demands that one maintain a particular stance, such action will occur regardless of the inconvenience suffered by one's opponent. Duragraha, on the other hand, is concerned with winning over or ultimately becoming superior to one's opponent. Meaning is located inside the person as the struggle becomes one of pride, rather than issue.

Gandhi's viewpoint reveals an ethical mode of coercion compatible with dialogue. As one responds to the demands of the situation and forgoes the self-aggrandizing of personal victory, ethical coercion can be given birth. In interpersonal conflict, this standard of ethical and unethical coercion is announced as one follows the dictates of the situation after listening to all viewpoints, and arrogant adherence to one's personal perceptions, respectively. In short,

coercion demanded by the situation is ethical. Coercion demanded by one's internal feelings, unless situationally supported, is not.

However, as one responds to the needs of coercion, dialogically one still recognizes the importance of one's opponent. Friedman states: "Sometimes that dialogue can only mean standing one's ground in opposition to him, witnessing for what one believes in the face of hostile reaction to it.... We must confirm him even as we oppose him, not in his 'error' but in his right to oppose us, in his existence as a human being whom we value even in opposing."[63] As Buber was aware, not all conflict situations are resolvable by dialogical terms. But as one moves into monologue, one should recognize the importance of this decision. The locus of meaning no longer emerges "between" persons. It is rooted inside oneself, which opens the door to autocratic behavior, perhaps benevolent or perhaps malicious. The limitations of this internal focus are further pressed in the next section.

Internal/External Bias

As referred to in Part One, both Simons and Ruben are in concurrence with this paper's questioning of an internal bias in communication and conflict studies. The dialogical implications of shifting to the "between" from the internal focus include a movement from an emphasis on affect to a stress on the situation and a pointing to interdependence instead of an individualistic ethic.

The humanistic movement that sprang from third-force psychologists was considered counter-cultural. But its emphasis on the internal

response of the person just moved the stress from the organizational "me" to the individual "me". The importance of I and Thou was left undescribed or, if announced, the Thou was viewed only through the internal perception of the I, not the relationship. In addition, an I - It orientation with a stress on internal "me" was inaccurately offered as a dialogical model, as alluded to earlier in the differences between Rogers' and Buber's approaches.

The internal viewpoint is associated with freedom, epitomized by the statement, "do your own thing." But such a freedom does not generate change for the powerless; it weakens collective action and works to the advantage of those in power. Philip Slater in Earthwalk calls it a "con job" to tell people to not conform and to "do their own thing." A misuse of individual freedom controls by making a coordinated effort against the system impossible.[64] Christopher Lasch has followed this same line of reasoning, as he critiqued psychological or internal man as the final product of bourgeois individualism. He stated that love with sacrifice is now being replaced by love as individual fulfillment.[65] The humanistic stress on the internal feelings did announce the importance of the human person. But it too easily weakens responsibility for others and lessens the chance of an organized conflict encounter designed to challenge the culture it purports to take to task.

Fitzpatrick and Winke (1979) speak of the influence of commitment in a relationship in conflict. They contend that the more committed a person feels to the relationship, the more risk one will take in terms of emotional outburst.[66] This paper visualizes a different relationship between commitment and affect. The more important the issue, the greater

is the need to respond to the demands of the situation, rather than affect. While one is emotionally upset and focusing on one's inner feelings, ways to resolve or manage a conflict situation may go unnoticed. This author contends that the less important the issue, the more appropriate following inner impulses should be. However, when the issue is of maximum importance, focus on the situation, not one's internal state is needed. If one is to locate a truth or solution to a conflict encounter that is transactional, as referred to by Brockriede,[67] or epistemic, as called by Scott,[68] attention must be on the situation emerging "between" persons, not one's internal criteria.

Such an orientation calls into question the move to conceptualize the individual person as the creator of the universe. As Gregory Bateson has stated, we need an ethic of relating "between" persons and events. The focus on the inner self as decision making center is a product, not of a new way of viewing the world, but old thinking that has led us into many serious errors.[69] Bateson and the assumptive base of dialogue imply a new Copernican Revolution that rejects the ethnocentric person and responds to the demands of the situation, at least when the conflict requires one's commitment and attention. The movement from "me" to relationship with the situation will be examined further in a dialogical critique of reward and effectiveness in the following section.

Maximizing Effectiveness

The importance of effectiveness, or at least some form of reward for one's efforts in a conflict encounter, is a major criteria in the evaluation of conflict outcome in our culture. A critical review article by Johnson (1974) emphasizes the importance of effectiveness.[70] Even the research on a culturally different orientation, such as pacifism, is judged by the effectiveness standard.[71] Effectiveness is a taken-for-granted cultural criteria of valuation based on a cause-effect view of certain behaviors eliciting appropriate responses. Also, the stress on effectiveness, usually defined by what benefits one's viewpoint, is accompanied by an emphasis on prediction. The assumed "values", effectiveness and prediction, are an inherent part of western culture; however, some research and theoretical perspectives, such as dialogue, reveal limitations of this orientation.

An interesting finding on the notion of effectiveness defined as winning was recorded by Reiches and Harral (1974). The results of their experiments reveal that winning as announced by a settlement favoring oneself is not enough to determine participant satisfaction in the encounter.[72] This result is in accordance with an interpersonal exchange where one wins an argument, but loses a relationship in the process.

Unlike the above, dialogue is rooted in concern for the other person and requires every effort to maintain a relationship as one fights for what is demanded by the situation, not one's internal feelings. If one defines effectiveness as winning the settlement, dialogue may not be possible. Effectiveness as answering the demands of the situation,

which may or may not result in a settlement favoring one's initial proposition, is grounded in dialogue. A person in dialogue does not see the issue as part of oneself, thereby limiting the extremes of personal triumph and defeat. Doing what is right for the situation, not winning, is the necessary action.

Following the situational demand is suggested by Rollo May in Power and Innocence with the concept of authentic innocence. He defines action that only satisfies due to personal victory as pseudoinnocence.[73] Interpersonally, a person dedicated to social change who must continually find reward or personal victory is likely to become a cynic, as that person's "helpful" actions are often met with failure and animosity. Long term involvement in social change requires rejecting the need for continual reinforcement, responding to the dialogical situation, and forgoing criteria of effectiveness that seeks personal victory.

Not only does one in dialogical conflict view the notion of effectiveness differently, one also rejects the impulse to base one's actions solely on prediction. Perhaps in conflict theory the orientation most dedicated to prediction is game theory. Yet even the limitations of this approach have been made known in articles such as "A Nonrational Approach to Theories of Conflict and Coalitions" by Mazur. ".... in 1957, it was already clear that game theory would not successfully describe most human behavior. This was hardly surprising. Von Neumann and Morgenstern had no intention of describing what people did do, but rather what they should do if they wanted to maximize their game outcomes."[74] Mazur then went on to state that game theory is appropriate if individuals remain rational and attempt to maximize

their gains and minimize losses.[75] The person in dialogical conflict could be viewed as inherently nonrational in that one does what is demanded by the situation, regardless of reward and predictions of outcome. Granted, few of our conflicts are encountered this way. But one can conceive of issues important enough to struggle for, no matter what the odds. As Brown and Keller state, dialogue is not appropriate for the faint-hearted.[76] It is the conflict method of one so committed to answering the demands of the historical situation that harm to self seems a lesser risk than ignoring a clearly heard request for action.

Conclusion

In the 1977 keynote address to the Central States Speech Convention, Marie Nichols posed a challenge to individuals interested in the interpersonal aspects of speech communication. She called for continuing inquiry into the foundation of interpersonal approaches.[77] This article has responded to her call for substance by delineating the major assumptions that ground our understanding of interpersonal conflict and examining each in the light of dialogical theory. The result is fourfold. First, the value with which one enters a conflict situation, establishment or change bias, is of greater importance than the word used to follow and qualify the term conflict. Second, coercion can be ethically appropriate, if the situation, not one's internal feelings, guides one's actions. Third, an internal bias personalizes the conflict; focus of attention needs to be on the transactional nature of the conflict situation "between" persons, not one's internal perceptions. And finally, effectiveness or reward is of secondary importance to the notion of responding to the

demands of the situation.

The perception of dialogue as opposing persuasion and conflict as held by numerous persons in the speech discipline[78] is inaccurate. Stephan Strasser, in his classic work on dialogue, states that conflict is fundamental and essential to any ongoing dialogue "between" persons.[79] The orientation of dialogue in meeting the conflicts of today is not conventional and in all probability will never be a popular best seller, for it necessitates a commitment to respond to the demands of the situation that make present our lack of courage. But those such as Buber, Gandhi, Bonhoeffer, King, and the unsung strugglers against what controls, limits, and oppresses people, announce its liveability, no matter how challenging.

Dialogue is certainly not the only conflict resolution method appropriate to our historical situation. But it does meet the demands of what Mickunas calls our transitional time,[80] by challenging societal assumptions of reward and egocentric views of communication. Dialogue is an opening to human conflict governed by concern for personhood, sensitivity to the situation, and the courage to follow commitment.

[1]See for example, Charles T. Brown and Paul W. Keller, Monologue to Dialogue: An Exploration of Interpersonal Communication (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973); Frank E.X. Dance, "Communication and Ecumenism," The Journal of Communication, 19(1969), pp. 14-21; Richard L. Johannesen, "The Emerging Concept of Communication As Dialogue," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 57 (1971), pp. 373-381; Floyd Matson and Ashley Montagu, eds., The Human Dialogue: Perspectives on Communication (New York: The Free Press, 1967); John Poulakos, "The Components of Dialogue," Western Speech, 38 (1974), pp. 199-212; John Stewart, ed., Bridges Not Walls: A Book About Interpersonal Communication (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1973); and John Stewart, "Foundations of Dialogic Communication," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 64 (1978), pp. 183-201.

[2]See for example, the foundational and/or critical works such as John Waite Bowers, ed., Speech Monographs, 41 (1974); Robert J. Doolittle, "Conflicting Views of Conflict: An Analysis of Basic Speech Communication Textbooks," 26 (1971), pp. 121-127; Robert J. Doolittle, Orientations to Communication and Conflict (Palo Alto, California: Science Research Associates, 1976); Alan C. Filley, Interpersonal Conflict Resolution (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman and Company, 1975); Joyce Hocker Frost and William W. Wilmot, Interpersonal Conflict (Dubuque, Iowa: W. C. Brown Company Publishers, 1978); Leonard C. Hawes and David H. Smith, "A Study of Assumptions Underlying The Study of Communication in Conflict," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (1973), pp. 423-435; Fred Jandt, Conflict Resolution Through Communication (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); Bonnie Johnson, "Images of the Enemy in Intergroup Conflict," Central States Speech Journal, 26 (1975), pp. 84-92; Gerald R. Miller and Herbert Simons, eds., Perspectives on Communication and Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974); Brent D. Ruben, "Communication and Conflict: A System Theoretic Perspective," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 64 (1978), pp. 202-210; and Herbert W. Simons, "Persuasion in Social Conflicts: A Critique of Prevailing Conceptions and a Framework for Future Research," Speech Monographs, 39 (1972), pp. 227-247.

[3]For rhetorical analysis, see for example, Dennis R. Bormann, "Adam Müller on the Dialogical Nature of Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 66 (1980), pp. 169-181; James R. Andrews, "The Rhetoric of Coercion and Persuasion: The Reform Bill of 1832," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 56 (1970) pp. 187-195; Parke G. Burgess, "Crisis Rhetoric: Coercion vs. Force", Quarterly Journal of Speech, 54 (1968), pp. 61-73; Robert L. Scott and Donald K. Smith, "The Rhetoric of Confrontation," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 55 (1969), pp. 1-8; and Herbert W. Simons, "Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 56 (1970), pp. 1-11.

[4]Barbara Stanford, "Conflict," Peacemaking: A Guide to Conflict Resolution for Individuals, Groups and Nations, Barbara Stanford, ed., (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1976), pp. 15-18.

[5]Brown and Keller, p. 200. Also see Ronald C. Arnett, Dwell in Peace: Applying Nonviolence to Everyday Relationships (Elgin, Ill.: The Brethren Press, 1980) which explores interpersonal conflict from a dialogical framework.

[6]See for example, Hawes and Smith, "A Study of Assumptions Underlying the Study of Communication in Conflict," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (1973), pp. 423-435; and Simons, "A Critique," pp. 227-247.

[7]Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in An Age of Diminishing Expectations (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1979).

[8]This frequently quoted remark is attributed to Tom Wolfe, but has been used by numerous social commentators.

[9]See for example, Frost and Wilmot, pp. 27-46.

[10]Throughout this paper, the term dialogue will refer to Martin Buber's dialogue, which is rooted in the phenomenological tradition. This is contrasted with the work of Carl Rogers, which is rooted in the psychological tradition. Buber, unlike Rogers, does not see the psyche as fundamental, it is secondary to the ontological reality "between" persons. For further discussion of the phenomenological roots of dialogue, see Stewert, "Foundations," pp. 183-201.

[11]Johannesen, pp. 373-381; Brown and Keller, pp. 183-208; Poulakos, pp. 199-212; Stewart, "Foundations," pp. 183-201.

[12]Martin Buber, The Knowledge of Man (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1965), p. 179.

[13]Herbert W. Simons, "Prologue," Perspectives, p. 4.

[14]C. David Mortensen, "A Transactional Paradigm of Verbalized Social Conflict," Perspectives, pp. 93-95.

[15]Although there is much common ground between the notion of transactionalism and Buber's "between", a distinction emerges when one conceptualizes each transaction as involving: (1) my image of myself,

(2) my image of you, (3) my image of your image of me, (4) your image of me, (5) your image of yourself, and (6) your image of my image of you. Buber contends that such a viewpoint strikes at the heart of any dialogue by placing the focus on image perception, instead of the communication being given birth "between" persons. For further discussion of Buber's position, see Buber, Knowledge, pp.75-78.

[16]For further discussion of psychologism and subjectivism see Maurice Friedman, The Hidden Human Image (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1974), pp. 274-316; and Richard Palmer, Hermeneutics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969), pp. 142-148.

[17]Maurice Friedman, "Introductory Essay," Knowledge, p. 26.

[18]Morton Deutsch, "Conflicts: Productive and Destructive," Journal of Social Issues, 25 (1969), p. 10.

[19]Ruben, p. 20.

[20]Ruben, p. 209.

[21]Maurice Friedman, To Deny Our Nothingness: Contemporary Images of Man (New York: Dell Publishing Co. Inc., 1967), p. 30.

[22]Viktor Frankl, The Will to Meaning (New York: Plume Books,1969), p. 62.

[23]Maurice Friedman, Touchstones of Reality: Existential Trust and the Community of Peace (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1974), p. 322.

[24]Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, (New York: The MacMillian Co., 1972), pp. 10-13.

[25]Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation" Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1 (1968), p. 11.

[26]Roderick P. Hart and Don M. Burks, "Rhetorical Sensitivity and Social Interaction," Speech Monographs, 39 (1972), pp. 75-91;

and Roderick P. Hart, Robert E. Carlson, and William F. Eadie, "Attitudes Toward Communication and the Assessment of Rhetorical Sensitivity," Communication Monographs, 47 (1980), pp. 1-22.

[27]Donald Darnell and Wayne Brockriede, Persons Communicating, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp. 176-178.

[28]John Stewart, "An Interpersonal Approach to the Basic Course," The Speech Teacher, 21 (1972), p. 9.

[29]Buber, Between, pp. 16-17.

[30]Viktor Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), p.34.

[31]Friedman, Touchstones, pp. 21-29.

[32]Maurice Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p.3.

[33]Maurice Friedman, "Martin Luther King: An American Gandhi and a Modern Job," Gandhi Marg, 12 (1968), pp. 230-239.

[34]Robert L. Scott, "Black Power Bends Martin Luther King," Speaker and Gavel, 5 (1968), p. 84.

[35]Simons, "Requirements," p. 10.

[36]Martin Luther King, Jr., "Let Us Be Dissatisfied!" Gandhi Marg, 12 (1968), p. 222.

[37]Martin Buber, A Believing Humanism: Gleanings (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 45.

[38]Martin Buber, Pointing the Way: Collected Essays (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 232.

[39]Buber, Pointing, p. 233.

[40]Scott and Smith, p.7.

[41]In addition to the Scott and Smith article stated earlier, see for example, Buber, "On Psychologizing the World," Gleanings, pp. 144-153; Buber, "Hope for this Hour," Human Dialogue, pp. 306-312; Friedman, "King," pp. 230-239; and Friedman, "Dialogue with the Absurd," Hidden, pp. 146-164.

[42]Hawes and Smith, p. 425.

[43]Hawes and Smith, p. 425.

[44]Stanley Deetz, "Essays on Hermeneutics and Communication Research" (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Ohio University, 1973), p. 63.

[45]Ronald C. Arnett, "Communication as Dialogical Interpretation" Speech Association of Minnesota Journal, 7 (1980), pp. 14-20.

[46]Anatol Rapoport, "Strategy and Conscience," Human Dialogue, pp. 79-96.

[47]John Waite Bowers, "Communication Strategies in Conflicts Between Institutions and Their Clients," Perspectives, pp. 132-133.

[48]Abraham H. Maslow, The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1970), pp. 119-127.

[49]Thomas R. Nilsen, Ethics of Speech Communication (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1974), p. 30.

[50]Karl R. Wallace, "An Ethical Basis of Communication", The Speech Teacher, 4 (1955), p. 7.

[51]Paul Wehr, Conflict Regulation (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979).

[52]Friedman, Hidden, pp. 286-316.

[53]For further discussion of debate between communication rooted in a "neutral" ideological base and inquiry grounded in commitment

to social change, see Lois Ramiro Beltran, "Research Ideologies in Conflict," Journal of Communication, 25 (1975), pp. 187-193.

[54]See for example, "Patterns of Persuasion in the Civil Rights Struggle," 15 (1967), pp. 25-27; "Confrontation As A Pattern of Persuasion in University Settings," 20 (1969), pp. 163-169; "Requirements" pp. 1-11; "Critique," pp. 227-247; and Perspectives, pp. 1-13.

[55]Hawes and Smith, pp. 432-435.

[56]Scott and Smith, pp. 7-8; Parke G. Burgess, "The Rhetoric of Black Power: A Moral Demand?," Quarterly Journal of Speech, (April, 1968), pp. 122-133; Burgess, "Crisis Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 54 (1968), pp. 67-73; and Robert L. Heath, "Dialectical Confrontation: A Strategy of Black Radicalism," Central States Speech Journal, 24 (1973), pp. 168-177.

[57]Dean C. Barnlund and Franklyn S. Haiman, The Dynamics of Discussion (Boston: Houghton Miffin, 1960), p. 12; and Haiman, "The Rhetoric of the Streets: Some Legal and Ethical Considerations," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 53 (1968) pp. 99-113.

[58]Nilsen, p. 61.

[59]V. V. Ramana Murti, "Buber's Dialogue and Gandhi's Satyagraha," Journal of the History of Ideas, 24 (1968), pp. 605-613; and Arnett, Peace, pp. 125-136.

[60]See for example Buber, "Gandhi, Politics, and Us" and "A Letter to Gandhi," Pointing, pp. 126-147; Avner Falk, "Buber and Gandhi," Gandhi Marg, (October, 1973), pp. 235-247; and Aubrey Hodes, Martin Buber: An Intimate Portrait (New York: Viking Press, 1971), pp. 161-175.

[61]Joan Bondurant, The Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. viii.

[62]Bondurant, pp. 33-34.

[63]Friedman, Hidden, p. 368.

[64]Philip Slater, Earthwalk (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1974), p. 187.

[65]Lasch, pp. 22-43.

[66]Mary Anne Fitzpatrick and Jeff Winke, "You Always Hurt the One You Love: Strategies and Tactics in Interpersonal Conflict," Communication Quarterly,(Winter, 1979), p. 10.

[67]Wayne Brockriede, "Arguers As Lovers," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 5 (1972), p. 9.

[68]Robert Scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic," Central States Speech Journal, 18 (1967), p. 13.

[69]"A Conversation with Gregory Bateson," ed. Thayer, Ethical, p. 248.

[70]David W. Johnson, "Communication and the Inducement of Cooperative Behavior in Conflicts: A Critical Review," Speech Monographs, 41 (1974), pp. 66-67.

[71]Richard Ofshe, "The Effectiveness of Pacifist Strategies: A Theoretical Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15 (1971), p. 269.

[72]Nancy A. Reiches and Harriet B. Harral, "Argument and Negotiation: A Theoretical and Empirical Approach," Speech Monographs, 41 (1974) p. 47.

[73]Rollo May, Power and Innocence: A Search for the Sources of Violence (New York: Dell Publishing Co. Inc., 1972), pp. 48-64.

[74]Allan Mazur, "A Nonrational Approach to the Theories of Conflict and Coalition," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 12 (1968), p. 196.

[75]Mazur, p. 197.

[76]Brown and Keller, pp. 199-203.

[77]Marie H. Nichols, "When You Set Out For Ithaca," Central States Speech Journal, 28 (1977), pp. 148-149.

[78]Nichols, p. 151.

[79]Stephan Strasser, The Idea of Dialogical Phenomenology, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 65.

[80]Algis Mickunas, "Civilizations as Structures of Consciousness," Main Currents in Modern Thought, 29 (1973), pp. 179-185.